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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
B. J. ANDERSON, ) Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. \ CASE 
I NO. 10794 
EUNICE SHUMWAY, ) Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising out of an au~ 
mobile accident. 
DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury foUhd 
the issues in favor of the defendant no cause of action by 
a vote of 6 to 2. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a decision awarding the plaintiff 
a new trial and remanding the case to the lower Court 
for tl1at purpose. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a supervisory employee at the United States 
Steel Company plant in Orem, Utah (R. 163). He lives 
in the Edgemont area of Provo, which is an area located 
along U.S. Highway 89 North of Provo toward the mouth 
of Provo Canyon (R. 163). This area is generally east of 
the Orem City limits and constitutes a sort of a panhandle 
adjunct north of Pro¥o proper. 
Mr. Anderson's normal route of travel from his place 
of employment to Provo was to travel east on Fourth South 
Street fu Orem to the edge of what is known as the Orem 
Bench. This location is called such because the major 
part of Orem is located on a plateau that is approximately 
50 feet above the elevation of the riverbottoms created by 
the Provo River. The "Riverbottoms," as known gener· 
ally in Utah County, is an area running generally no1111 
and south about five miles long and at t:he point ()If Fom1:h 
South in Orem, approximately one mile wide. On the west 
side of the Riverbottoms and at the base of the east bank 
·of the· Orem Bench, a road which is known as the Carter· 
ville Road runs generally no,rth and south. Tllis. road joins 
Fourth South Street in Orem by two roads that meet 
Fourth South Street in the form of a "Y", one road going 
to the Carterville Road in a southerly direction, and one 
road going to the Carterville Road in a nor~herly direction; 
both roads commencing at Fourth South in Orem and join· 
ing Carterville Road within approximately one block of 
. their departure from that street. It was Mr. Anderson's 
-habit to turn onto the right portion of the "Y" so that he 
· took the route to the Carterville Road traveling in a south· 
erly direction, and then it was his habit to cross the River· 
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bottoms on a State Road and return to U. S. Highway 89 
where he traveled north again to his residence. 
On the day of the accident, November 12, 1964, Mr. 
Anderson left his place of employment at about 4:00 P. M. 
tR. 164). He traveled the route described. It was overcast 
and raining rather hard. Because of the inclement weather, 
Ml'. Anderson drove his automobile rather slowly (R. 166). 
As he approached the "Y" formed by Fourth South Street 
in Orem and the Carterville access roads, the rain had 
turned to a sleet like snow (R. 165). He was driving a 1959 
Oldsmobile Sedan, white in color (R. 165). His heater and 
defroster were both on (R. 165). The windshield wipers 
were working and he could see well (R. 65). He was fa-
miliar with the road (R. 164). He had been driving at 
approximately 20 miles per hour (R. 166), but as he turned 
into the right angle of the "Y" he brought ·his car to a 
very slow sp2ed, almost to a stop (R. 166). He could see 
Mrs. Shumway's, the respondent's car, coming north on the 
acc>ess road just after he had completed the entry onto the 
"Y" portion (R. 166). It became apparent to him that 
Mrs. Shumway was taking more than her share of the 
highway, consequently, he pulled as far to the right as he 
could, "up against the bank" (R. 167), and brought his 
car "almost to a stop." (R. 166, 167). As the Shumway 
vehicle approached he noticed that the windshield of the 
car was fogged up so that he could not see the image of 
the person driving the car (R. 168). Mrs. Shumway drove 
her vehicle north approximately 200 feet, (R. 168), struck 
the front end of the Anderson vehicle with the left front 
0f her automobile (R. 169). She glanced off of the An-
derson car, traveled northerly along the side of the Ander-
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son car, and tw·ned onto Fourth South Street in Orem 
' 
bringing her car to a halt at the north side of Fourth South 
Stroot in Orem at the point indicated on Exhibit 1 West 
of the intersection of the "Y" (R. 169). 
Sergeant Reed Burgener of the Orem Police Depart-
ment testified. He testified that he had been a police offi. 
cer for Orem City for 14% years (R. 122). He testified 
that he arrived at the scene approximately three minutes 
after he received the call from his dispatcher (R. 124). 
Officer Burgener diagramed the circumstances on Exhibit 
"1" (R. 123). He stated that the accident occurred in 
Mr. Anderson's lane of traffic (R. 141). He testified that 
the road at the location of the accident was 21 feet wide, 
(R. 154), and that the point oif impact occurred 13 feet 
west of the east side of the road (R. 141, 153, 154). 
. He· talked to botll drivers, (R. 28), he exan1ined the 
scene of the collision and made measurements (R. 26 and 
28). Based upon his e~perience, his observation, and the 
statements made to him by the drivers in the presence of 
each other, Officer Burgener concluded 'that the collision 
took place in the plaintiff's lane of traffic (R. 131, 136, 
141). Officer Burgener stated that both drivers confirmed 
the point where the impact took place ( R. 137, 138) . It 
was the opinion of the police officer that the accident took 
place in Mr. Anderson's lane of traffic, (R. 141), and that 
Mrs. Shumway was at least two and one-half feet into Mr. 
Anderson's lane of traffic (R. 141). Officer Burgener 
stated that the Anderson car did not move from the p,);nt 
of collision (R. 138). Mrs. Shumway told the officer she 




Sergeant Burgener has had specialized training in the 
investigation of automobile accidents (R. 143), and has 
learned how to locate points of impact (R. 144). He further 
found that while the Anderson car had moved approxi-
mately three feet to the south after the impact, that it 
was up against the bank on the west side of the road (R 
158). Sergeant Burgener's diagram indicating the loca-
tion of the automobiles and the point of collision demon-
strates that the west side of the Shwnway automobile was 
at least from three to eight feet west of the center line 
of the road at the moment of collision (Exhibit 1, R. 158). 
Mrs. Shumway's version of the collision is set forth in 
response to direct examination as follows: (R. 202) 
"Q. As you approached this intersection just tell us 
in your own words what happened? 
A. Well, it was raining real hard. I was driving quite 
slow. It was hard for me to see, and as I go up there I 
just started to making the turn as this car hit, and I 
stopped. 
Q. Did you see the car of Mr. Anderson before the 
impact? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Where was your vehicle in relation to this inter-
section when the accident happened? 
A. It was on the side of the road. As I went up the 
road I kept my one wheel off on the gravel.' 
Her testimony concerning the accident on cross-exam-
ina tion is set forth verbatim: (R. 205) 
"Q. If I undersand it, you turned your lights on after 
you left Mr. King's residence? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had them on bright, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is so you could dim them when other cars 
shined their lights on yoru in a bright fashion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see anybody with their lights on bright? 
A. They all had them on. 
Q. The fact is you could see without your lights? 
A. Yes, but it was awful dim, cloudy and dark. 
Q. Did the lights on your car show the way for you, 
or were they merely to show to other cars where you were? 
A. Well, yoru could say both. 
Q. Did yoru have to use your lights in order to discern 
the roadway in front of you? 
A. No, it wasn't quite that dark. 
· Q. That is right. Your lights were merely on for 
the purpose of indicating to other traffic where you were, 
isn't that true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't have to dim your lights at all for that 
purpose, did you, Mrs. Shumway? 
A. Well, other people dimmed them on me. 
Q. I see. As I understand your testimony when you 
were going north on this ramp road, or as Mr. Garrett says, 
the access road, you go with one wheel on the gravel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that your normal way to drive? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. · That is ·so you are certain that you are on the far 
extremity of the road? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is how you tell? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can't you tell by watching the roadway in front 
of you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It's your impression as you approached the cor-
ner you had started to turn and that is when the collision 
took place? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it possible that you-as I understand your tes-
timony you stated, "It was hard for me to see". 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was hard for you to see, wasn't ·it?· That is 
true, isn't if? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you started to turn. Let me ask you this: Is 
it possible that you started to twn before you got to the 
corner? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You are sure of that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You never at any time saw Mr. Anderson's car? 
A. No, sir. I had never seen Mr. Anderson. 
Q. You didn't see him until the collision took place? 
A. That is right. 
Q. The first indication and notice to you that he was 
on the roadway is when yoo heard the sound of the im-
pact? 
A. Yes, sir." 
8 
Mrs. Shumway remained in her automobile Wltil she 
was released by the police officer. She never got out of 
the car to investigate the scene of the accident or the loca. 
tion of the point of impact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIREC-
TED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMI'TI'ING THE 
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF THE DE· 
FENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF CON· 
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
For the purpose of the argument, all three points will 
be considered together, for they relate to the same com· 
mon fact situation. At the clme of the defendant's case 
in ohief, the plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict 
on the issue of liability. 
The facts clearly indicate negligence on the part of 
the defendant and there appears to be no basis upon which 
the court or jury could conclude that the defendant was 
free from negligence. Plaintiff respectfully submits to the 
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Court that the only evidence of contributory negligence is 
that submitted by the defendant in respect to how she nor-
mally drives her automobile with the right wheels in the 
gravel, thereby inferring that she might have been on the 
right side of the road at the time of the collision. This 
testimony, fragile as it is, is the only evidence upon which 
the jury could have decided the case against the plaintiff, 
and it is contended by plaintiff that such evidence is not 
sufficient to warrant submitting the question of contribu-
tory negligence to the jury. To do so was error. 
We respectfully state that while the law allows great 
latitude to the Judge in submitting the questiOtilS of negli-
gence and contributory negligence to the jury, that there 
are, nevertheless, principles that are aipplicalble to these 
issues that allow the court to take from the jury questions 
of negligence where the facts warrant such direction. While 
no Utah case could be found which holds that a trial court 
must direct a ve1,dict when the facts are such as they are 
in this case, nevertheless there is Utah authority that the 
standard for directing a verdict as to eontributory negli-
gence is the same as the general standard for negligence. 
There are also several cas2·s on contributory negligence 
that can be used to support our contention that where no 
evidence is adduced by the defendant to show the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, the court errs if it permits 
the jury to pass on the question of contributory negligence. 
Since the question concerning negligence is the same 
as the question concerning CGntributory negligence, the 
cases orf Jensen v. Dolen, 367 P2d 191, 12 Utah 2d 404 (1962) 
and Strlckle v. Union Pacific Ra.ilrood Company, 251 P2d 
867, 122 Utah 477 (1952) stand for the proposition that 
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the principles for directing a verdict apply in identical 
fashion to the question of the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence: 
"Except that defendant has the burden of proof." 
Strickle, Page 870 
These cases also establish the proposition that the trial 
court, when satisfied that reasonable men would not differ 
on the question of negligence, may direct a verdict for the 
plaintiff. In the principal case, we are of the opinion that 
the principles in the Strickle case and in the Jensen case : 
would require the court to find,, as a matter of law, that 
the defendant was negligent and so instruct the jury. We 
also believe that the principles enunciated in Cox v. Thomp-
son, 254 P2d 1047, 123 Utah 81 (1953) and Takataro Shiba 
vs. Weiss, 282 P2d 341, 3 Utah 2d 256 (1955) also support 
the proposition that: 
"From a fair appraisal of the evidence, reasonable me:1 
cannot draw but one inference and that inference point: 
unerringly to the negligence of the decedent (defend-
ant), then the court should and can direct a verdict of 
negligence." 
In the Cox and Shiba case, the court found that the 
plaintiffs in both instances were guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law. The principles enunciated in 
these two cases are also applicable to the situation of neg-
ligence and in the situation in the principal case where the 
defendant, at no time prior to the collision, saw the plain· , 
tiff and has no explanation for the accident, it seems obvi-
ous to us that she was negligent as a matter of law and 
that this fact should have been pointed out to the jury and 
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they should not have been allowed to speculate on the ques-
tion of whether the defendant was negligent or not. 
As the case came back from the jury, there is no way 
of knowing whether the main reason for denial of the plain-
tiff's cause was the failure of the plaintiff to establish neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant or the finding of the 
jury that the plaintiff was negligent in some particular. 
In either event, the plaintiff must state to the court that 
he cannot find any basis for them to find 1Jhe defendant 
free from negligence or the plaintiff guilty of negligence. 
In the case of Lindberg v. Needles, 97 A2d 9011 40 
A.L.R. 2d 226, 230 (Ind. 1953), the court held that while 
in that case it was appropriate to allow the jury to consider 
the question of contributory negligence, in other circum-
stances a court errs when permitting a jury to consider 
contributory neglig€'11ce. The court in that case stated: 
"Conversely, if there is no evidence of acts or conduct 
from which a re,asona:ble mind could find or infer neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff, it is error to in-
struct a jury as to contributory negligenc.-e." · 
"If the plaintiff does not himself adduce evidence of 
negligence on his part, and the defendant fails to pro-
duce testimony which will justify a finding of such 
negligence, the court should not instruct the jury at 
all ar,; to contributory negligence, or should instruct 
the jury as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not 
guilty of contributory negligence." 
"The exceptions of the appellant to the Court's charge 
on contributory negligence amounted, in substance, to 
a request for a directed verdict for the plaintiff on 
the issue of contributoty negligence. The appellant 
was entitled t.o this instruction if there was no evidenre 
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from which a reasonable mind could find or infer that 
he had directly contributed to his own injury by be-
having as an ordinarily prudent man would not be-
have, under the circumstances." 
We think that the rule enundated by the Indiana court 
as applied to the facts in this case, would dictate that it 
was error for the court to submit the question of contribu-
tory negligence to the jury. There is not a scintilla of ev-
idence from which a reasonable mind could find or infer 
that the plaintiff had directly contributed to his own in-
jury by behaving as an ordinary prudent man would not 
behave under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that the evidence 
conclusively shows that the defendant was negligent. The 
court should have instructed the jury that the defendant 
was negligent as a matter of law. In the second place, the I 
only evidence that could be used to draw an inference that I 
the appellant was negligent, was the fact that Mrs. Shum-
way claimed the right wheels of her car were on the gra-
vel to the right of the road and, therefore, if an accident 
happened, the jury must conclude that the ruppellant was 
on the wrong. side of the road. The inference of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the appellant, therefore, must 
be deduced not from proof made by the defendant, but from 
her statement that she normally drove with the right wheels 
in the gravel. We respectfully state that that evidence does 
not carry the burden of proof and that there was not suffi· 
cient evidence of contributory negligence to submit to the 
jury for conclusion. The appellant urges the Court to find 
l 
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that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the 
part of the appellant to submit to the jury; that the court 
should have directed a verdict in favor of the appellant, and 
that the court by submitting the question of the defend-
ant's negligence to the jury committed error as a matter 
of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOW ARD, for 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
Edward M. Garrett, Hanson and Garrett, Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent, 520 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this~ ___ day of March, 1967. 
Jackson B. Howard 
